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ABSTRACT
The problem of localizing nodes without relying on
GPS by employing a small fraction of anchor nodes,
which are aware of their positions, is considered to be
an important service for a wide variety of applications
in wireless ad hoc networks. Several approaches aim-
ing at defeating attackers by means of robustness in-
stead of pure cryptographic measures have been pro-
posed. Yet they all are making assumptions primar-
ily focused on single-hop based localization schemes.
Hence, we discuss threats and requirements to be ful-
ﬁlled by multi-hop based localization mechanisms and
compile a comprehensive attacker model. Furthermore,
we discuss shortcomings of existing evaluation tech-
niques and propose a uniﬁed approach for evaluating
multi-hop based localization schemes. Finally, utiliz-
ing the mean and the median to estimate and select a
hop length, we evaluate the suitability of Linear Least
Squares (LLS) based on the l2-Norm and provide a
comparative evaluation with LLS based on the l1-Norm,
a l1-Norm based ﬁltering scheme and the well-known
Least Median of Squares (LMS) approximation em-
ploying each norm. We show that the l1-Norm is able
to reduce the mean estimation error and that LMS as
well can beneﬁt from the l1-Norm. Additionally, we ar-
gue that, assuming a DV-hop scheme, LMS is not able
to meet its requirements when using the mean for hop
length estimation and selection. We conclude that em-
ploying the median in this context leads to more accu-
rate results.
Index Terms— Secure localization, Optimization,
Multi-hop
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks offer a wide variety of pos-
sible applications in the context of sensor networks rang-
ing from environmental monitoring to intrusion detec-
tion and battleﬁeld surveillance. An important service
for these applications is the localization of the partic-
ipants without relying on GPS. Thus the problem of
localizing sensors using only a small fraction of an-
chor or beacon nodes, which are aware of their loca-
tion, has gained much attention from researchers in the
past decade. A lot of proposed schemes assume co-
operative behavior among the nodes to achieve local-
ization. Since many applications require the deploy-
ment of nodes in an adversarial environment, the prob-
lem of providing secure and robust localization has led
to a variety of mechanisms aiming at either preventing
the attacker from disturbing the process of localization,
detecting and repairing such intervention or using ro-
bust statistical methods to offer graceful degradation
in the face of an attack. Yet most approaches require
single-hop communication between nodes and anchors
to conduct distance measurements. In contrast, multi-
hop schemes require only a small amount of anchor to
enable localization. Such mechanisms may provide a
rough estimation by having the anchors ﬂood their lo-
cation into the network. Nodes receiving this infor-
mation forward it to their neighbors while either in-
crementing a hop count value or summing up a dis-
tance measurement contained in the packets traveling
through the network. Participants receiving the loca-
tion (xi, yi) and the measured distance di to at least
three anchor nodes are able to estimate their own lo-
cation by applying lateration to the set of references
(xi, yi, di). The nodes may subsequently reﬁne this
estimate by iteratively exchanging locations and dis-
tance measurements with their neighbors. Despite their
promising nature, not much effort has been made in the
past to secure multi-hop localization schemes.
In this paper, we make the following contributions.
First, we discuss threats and requirements to be ful-
ﬁlled by multi-hop based localization mechanisms and
compile a comprehensive attacker model. Second, we
discuss shortcomings of existing evaluation techniques
and propose a uniﬁed approach for evaluating multi-
hop based localization schemes. Finally, we investi-
gate the feasibility of the l1-Norm in contrast to the
widely-used l2-Norm to enhance the robustness of ex-
isting multi-hop based localization schemes. Addition-
ally, we provide a formal description of Linear Least
Squares (LLS) motivating the use of the l1-Norm. We
are able to support our assumption in a comparative
evaluation with Linear Least Squares based on the l1-
Norm and the l2-Norm, a new l1-Norm based ﬁltering
approach and the Least Median of Squares (LMS) ap-
proximation [1]. By employing both the mean and me-
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dian to estimate and select the hop length required by
the multi-hop based DV-hop, we are able to show that,
by using the mean, LMS is not able to hold against a
basic attack. Hence we investigate the source of this
behavior and are able to show that only by applying
the median, LMS based schemes may be considered a
robust solution.
2. MULTI-HOP LOCALIZATION
In contrast to single-hop localization schemes, which
require connectivity to at least three anchor nodes, multi-
hop based techniques aim at supplying participants with
the necessary beacon coordinates and distance measure-
ments aggregated over several hops. Three of the most
well-known approaches for multi-hop localization are
evaluated by LANGENDOEN and REIJERS [2], iden-
tifying the following common phases: Distance mea-
surement phase, location estimation phase and an op-
tional reﬁnement phase. Since the reﬁnement phase
depends on the correctness of ﬁrst two phases, we con-
centrate our efforts on the inspection of their vulner-
abilities. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the re-
ﬁnement phase may very well provide an attacker with
additional opportunities for tampering with the results
of the localization process. We also subdivide the de-
scription of the distance measurement phase in the fol-
lowing section into several sub-sections to emphasize
the different steps of the protocol.
2.1. Distance measurement
Location dissemination: In the distance measurement
phase references containing the location of the corre-
sponding anchor nodes are ﬂooded into the network.
Since ﬂooding is very expensive, SAVARESE et al. pro-
pose for each node to stop broadcasting further mes-
sages once it has received a sufﬁcient number of ref-
erences to estimate its own location [3]. Another way
to reduce the communication overhead is proposed by
ZENG et al. [4]. They suggest to use a ﬁxed hop
limit known by all participants and have nodes drop a
packet once its hop count value exceeds the given hop
limit. Upon receiving a location references, participat-
ing nodes (i.e. nodes and anchors) adjust an aggregated
measurement value in the received packet by adding the
measured distance to its sender. In case the received
message offers some new or useful information to the
participant (reception of a reference from a previously
unknown beacon node or a shorter route to an already
known anchor), the node then broadcasts the modiﬁed
message. Nodes may either use range-based methods
requiring specialized hardware, possibility involving a
ranging protocol and a measurement message exchange
(DV-distance [5]) or connectivity information to sum
up hops in order to measure the distance to another
node (DV-hop [5, 3]). The second option additionally
demands each node to obtain an estimate of the length
of a hop in order to translate the number of hops to a
distance.
Hop length estimation: The above mentioned hop
length estimate required by DV-hop is calculated by an-
chors using the information received from other beacon
nodes. Since anchors know their own location, upon
the reception of the coordinate of another anchor, a
beacon node is able to compute the euclidean distance
between itself and its counterpart and divide the calcu-
lated distance by the number of hops the correspond-
ing packet has traveled. An anchor may also receive
a packet from more than just one other anchor. Thus
multiple hop length estimates resulting from anchors
are merged by calculating the mean of estimates. An-
chors may also use the median instead of the mean to
estimate the hop length to limit the potential inﬂunce of
an attacker [4]. After having estimated a hop length, the
anchor broadcasts its estimate into the network using a
second message to provide nodes with the necessary in-
formation. Like proposed by ZENG et al. [4], it is also
possible to have anchors broadcast messages in regu-
lar intervals and piggy-back the hop length estimate (if
available) with the regular location information.
Hop length selection: Although only one hop length
estimate is required at each node, it typically receives
multiple hop length estimates from different anchors.
They are combined calculating the mean of the corre-
sponding values, although, as we will show, using the
median instead of the mean is assumed to be more ro-
bust in the face of an attack.
2.2. Location estimation
After having received at least three references, the nodes
estimate their own location using one of the approaches
described in more detail in section 3. If there are only
one or two references available, a limited guess about
the rough position of the node might still be possible,
but is generally considered to be too error-prone to be
used for location estimation. Therefore any estimation
technique running at a node is presumed to fail with a
node holding less than three references.
3. LOCATION ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
In order to estimate a location from a set of references
(xi, yi, di), several mechanisms based on solving an
optimization problem have been proposed [5, 3, 6]. For
this class of algorithms, to determine its position, each
node performs multilateration. In this work we only
consider the two-dimensional case without loss of gen-
erality. In case of N given references (xi, yi, di) with
N ≥ 3, not all lying on a straight line, each reference
is interpreted as a circle with center (xi, yi) and radius
di, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Ideally, assuming distance mea-
surements free of errors and manipulation, this would
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result in a set of circles intersecting at the coordinate, at
which the node resides. Hence it would be sufﬁcient to
solve a system of non-linear equations to ﬁnd this point
of intersection:
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 = d2i (i = 1, . . . , N)
One approach for being able to deal with error-prone
measurements is to consider the above over-determined
system of equations. Due to the measurement errors or
manipulated distance values, this system is in general
unsolvable. Therefore, we deﬁne the assumed position
(xˆ, yˆ) as:(
xˆ
yˆ
)
:= argmin
x,y
N∑
i=1
[√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 − di
]2
Solving this non-linear optimization problem is too ex-
pensive as it usually requires techniques of global op-
timization. Therefore, this problem is approximated as
described below.
The system of non-linear equations described above
can be linearized by subtracting the mean of all left and
right parts [1]
1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
d2i
resulting in the matrix form Ax = b of the system,
where
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
x1 − 1N
N∑
i=1
xi y1 − 1N
N∑
i=1
yi
...
...
xN − 1N
N∑
i=1
xi yN − 1N
N∑
i=1
yi
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
∈ R(N,2)
and
b =
1
2
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(x21 − 1N
N∑
i=1
x2i ) + (y
2
1 − 1N
N∑
i=1
y2i )−
(d21 − 1N
N∑
i=1
d2i )
...
(x2N − 1N
N∑
i=1
x2i ) + (y
2
N − 1N
N∑
i=1
y2i )−
(d2N − 1N
N∑
i=1
d2i )
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
∈ RN
Another way to linearize this overdetermined system of
equations is to subtract one single equation from every
other [5]. However, in this case the risk of a malicious
reference to strongly affect the benign ones might be
higher. We therefore assume that it is more desirable
to use the mean of all equations in order to reduce the
potential inﬂuence of one or more attackers.
For 1 ≤ p < ∞ the lp-Norm of a vector r =
(r1, . . . , rN ) ∈ RN is deﬁned as:
‖r‖p :=
(
N∑
i=1
|ri|p
) 1
p
With this, we estimate the assumed position according
to: (
x¯
y¯
)
= argmin
x
‖Ax− b‖p
Furthermore, it is easy to see that x¯ is a solution of
MIN
x
‖Ax− b‖p
if and only if x¯ is a solution of
MIN
x
‖Ax− b‖pp
This allows to use a simpliﬁed way of computing x¯ as
described below.
3.1. l2 – Linear Least Square (l2-LLS)
The value of pmay be selected accordingly to ﬁt a spe-
ciﬁc application and is, in terms of localization in wire-
less ad hoc networks, typically set to p = 2. The solu-
tion of the resulting problem(
x¯
y¯
)
= argmin
x
‖Ax− b‖22
= argmin
x
{
N∑
i=1
(aix− bi)2
}
with ai denoting the ith row of matrix A and bi de-
noting the ith component of vector b can be computed
by solving a system of linear equations. For this, QR-
factorization is applied to A:
A = QR where Q ∈ R(N,N),R ∈ R(N,2)
Q−1 = QT , R =
(
R1
0
)
A = Q
(
R1
0
)
=
(
Q1,Q2
)(R1
0
)
= Q1R1
where R1 is an upper triangular matrix and (Q1, Q2) is
an appropriate decomposition of Q. Hence, we obtain:
‖Ax− b‖22 = (Rx−QTb)TQTQ(Rx−QTb)
= (Rx−QTb)T (Rx−QTb)
=
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
(
R1
0
)
x−
(
QT1
QT2
)
b
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
2
=
∣∣∣∣R1x−QT1 b∣∣∣∣22 + ∣∣∣∣QT2 b∣∣∣∣22
Finally, by solving R1x¯ − QT1 b = 0, an estimate for
the assumed position xˆ of the node can be retrieved
with min
x
‖Ax− b‖22 =
∣∣∣∣QT2 b∣∣∣∣22.
3.2. l1 – Linear Least Square (l1-LLS)
While following the method described above is consid-
ered to be the most feasible of all optimization-based
approaches for use in wireless ad hoc networks, it is
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vulnerable to malicious references forging the location
or the distance to an anchor. Compared to the l2-Norm,
the l1-Norm is generally less vulnerable to outliers con-
tained in the data, e.g. caused by measurement errors.
Therefore, the use of the l1-Norm might increase the
robustness of existing localization schemes against at-
tackers.
Employing the l1-Norm, the assumed position of a
node is estimated by solving the following optimization
problem:(
x¯
y¯
)
= argmin
x
‖Ax− b‖1
= argmin
x
{
N∑
i=1
|aix− bi|
}
This problem can be formulated as a linear optimiza-
tion problem by introducing a vector
h = (h1, h2, . . . , hN ) ∈ RN
of auxiliary variables hi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. With
this, the optimization problem can be rewritten as fol-
lows:
MIN
x
{
N∑
i=1
|aix− bi|
}
⇔ MIN
x,h
{
N∑
i=1
hi
∣∣∣∣∣ − h ≤ Ax− b ≤ h
}
With this, we obtain
MIN
x,h
{
(0T ,1T )
(
x
h
)∣∣∣∣
(
A −E
−A −E
)(
x
h
)
≤
(
b
−b
)}
where E is the identity matrix of dimension N , 0 =
(0, 0)T ∈ R2 and 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T ∈ RN .
Although estimating the assumed position using the
l1-Norm involves solving a linear optimization prob-
lem, we note that the complexity of this problem is
comparatively small with up to N + 2 variables and
2N constraints and already solvable in a few millisec-
ond on a present 2.4 GHz machine for a set of N = 50
two-dimensional references. We thus assume that this
kind of processing power might very well be available
to future applications, which are not as resource con-
strained as nodes in today’s sensor networks.
4. THREAT ANALYSIS
There are a number of known attacks, which can be
launched against multi-hop schemes [4], assuming that
the goal of an attacker is to msilead nodes to obtain an
incorrect position. Here it is important to differentiate
how many nodes the attacker wants to manipulate. He
or she might try to inﬂuence as many nodes as possible
or target a few speciﬁc nodes. Therefore, when eval-
uating secure localization schemes, either the mean or
maximum estimation error can be of interest.
We now give a short overview of the possibilities of
an attacker with the above goals in a multi-hop local-
ization environment. It should be noted that the follow-
ing attacks may also be launched by multiple colluding
nodes in order to increase their strength. In this case
the ratio of malicious participants among benign ones
is deﬁned as contamination ratio . This ratio usually
refers to the corresponding originator of the attack, i.e.
if launched by an anchor, the contamination ratio refers
to the ratio of malicious anchors among benign ones.
Sybil attack: Robust localization schemes trying
to ﬁlter malicious data instead of employing means of
cryptography (section 5) usually rely on the majority
of references (more than 50%) originating from benign
anchors. Therefore, one of the potentially most harm-
ful threats is the Sybil attack, where an attacker forges
multiple identities. By distributing faked messages for
a speciﬁc number of anchors, an attacker might be able
to control the majority of references in the network.
Benign anchor references then might be classiﬁed as
outliers by the robust localization algorithm, possibly
even augmenting the strength of the attack.
Faked anchor location: Assuming a mechanism
to prevent the Sybil attack, a trusted anchor might still
get compromised. Hence an attacker could be able to
fabricate messages for a corresponding anchor. By an-
nouncing a forged location or a faked initial distance
measurement value (e.g. increased initial hop count),
a node trying to localize itself might be mislead about
the position of the anchor, assuming itself to reside at a
forged location.
Faked hop length: Apart from faking its location,
in DV-hop based localization schemes, a compromised
anchor might distribute a manipulated hop length esti-
mate. Since this estimate is used by nodes to translate
the number of hops to anchors to a distance value, a
node trying to estimate its location might be mislead
about its whereabouts.
Reference modiﬁcation: In addition to the attacks
involving anchors described above, malicious nodes may
pose a possible threat as well. Apart from the risk
of attackers modifying the location or hop length es-
timate inside anchor messages being forwarded, which
could be countered by data origin authentication, par-
ticipants are required to modify the contents of anchor
messages for the sake of adjusting the distance mea-
surement value accordingly (i.e. increase the hop count
by one). Hence, even assuming data origin authenti-
cation, the manipulation of this value (incrementing,
decrementing or setting the distance resp. hops) is con-
sidered a threat to the process of localization.
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Wormhole attack: Assuming protection against
the threats mentioned above, an attacker might still em-
ploy a wormhole attack [7] to manipulate a great num-
ber of benign references. Since in a wormhole attack an
attacker may tunnel and replay anchor messages at a re-
mote location without modifying the distance measure-
ment value, nodes may mistakenly assume a shorter
route to the respective beacon node actually residing
at a more distant location. This also poses a possible
threat to robust localization schemes since any message
from any benign anchor gets manipulated implicitly by
traveling through the wormhole. Hence, for an attacker,
manipulating a great number of the references is just a
matter of tunneling messages from as many different
anchors as possible.
Pollution attack: Concerning the pollution attack
[8], an attacker might make use of the fact, that sub-
sets of benign references may agree upon a node pos-
sibly residing at a location different from the actual es-
timated coordinate. This especially is a problem for
overlap-based approaches, where shapes typically over-
lap at different locations, with the estimate being se-
lected by the area where most references overlap. Thus,
by forging or manipulating anchor messages and using
a different location where a subset of benign references
overlap, an attacker might be able to create an area with
a greater number of overlapping references (compared
to the benign area of intersection).
5. COUNTERMEASURES
Several methods to defeat one or more of the threats
described in section 4 have been proposed. They can
be divided in the following two classes:
• Attack detection and response aiming at detect-
ing malicious nodes and responding accordingly
to their presence.
• Robust localization techniques trying to ﬁlter ma-
licious references by employing statistical meth-
ods for outlier detection before computing a lo-
cation estimate.
In this work, we focus on the second class of robust lo-
calization schemes. With this class of approaches, any
manipulation of the references by one or more attack-
ers should ideally be unsuccessful, as long as more than
50% of the references are still benign. Consequently,
this is only possible if attackers are unable to launch a
Sybil attack and forge references for one or more non-
existing anchors. In the past, several robust localization
schemes have been proposed [1, 9, 10, 11]. Here, we
only consider the well-known LMS algorithm [1], as
well as a new technique described in section 5.2, focus-
ing on possible advantages of using the l1-Norm com-
pared to the commonly used l2-Norm in the context of
a multi-hop based localization scheme.
5.1. Least Median of Squares (LMS)
The optimization problem deﬁned in section 3 is not ro-
bust against outliers. Therefore LI et al. [1] propose the
use of the following optimization problem as a starting
point for estimating the assumed position:
(
xˆ
yˆ
)
= argmin
x,y
medi
N∑
i=1
[√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 − di
]2
Solving this non-linear problem exactly is again too
complex. Thus this problem is approximated by us-
ing the following algorithm, which is based on estimat-
ing assumed positions for a series of randomly selected
subsets of the N given references [1, 12]:
1. Select a subset size n (typically n = 4).
2. Randomly drawM subsets of size n from the set
of given references. Compute a location estimate
for each subset j = 1, . . . ,M using l2-LLS and
calculate the median of the estimation residuals
r2ij to each anchor i = 1, . . . , N .
3. Deﬁne m = argminj medi
{
r2ij
}
(least median
of all medians of each subset).
4. Calculate s0 = 1.4826(1 + 5N−2 )
√
medir2im.
5. Assign a weight wi to each reference:
wi =
{
1 | ris0 | ≤ 2.5
0 otherwise
6. Compute a weighted least squares of all given
references using weights wi. This is equivalent
to computing l2-LLS with only the references
with weight wi = 1.
The probability of drawing at least one benign subset
of size n from M drawings, given the contamination
ratio , can be calculated as follows:
P = 1− (1− (1− )n)M
Therefore, the required number of drawings M can be
computed for an assumed or known contamination ra-
tio  and a selected probability P :
M =
⌈
log(1− P )
log(1− (1− )n)
⌉
For example, given P = 0.99, one would have to select
M = 17 subsets for  = 0.3 and M = 34 subsets for
for  = 0.4.
In order to capture the basic idea behind this algo-
rithm, please note that it computes an assumed position
for each subset of anchors, and that for each assumed
position it computes the median of the differences of
distances to all anchor points (step 2). Step 3 selects the
minimum of all these medians which will be smaller or
equal to a value obtained with the assumed position for
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one of the benign subsets (under the assumption that
less than 50% of anchors are manipulated). Based on
this value, steps 4 to 6 decide which anchor points will
be ignored in the position estimation (see [1, 12] for
further explanations).
Apart from evaluating LMS using l2-LLS (which
from now on we will refer to as l2-LMS), we also con-
sider a variation of LMS employing l1-LLS which we
call l1-LMS.
5.2. ¯− l1 − LLS – ﬁltering
In addition to the existing approaches, we describe a
simple new optimization-based technique called ¯ −
l1 − LLS – ﬁltering, which uses a preprocessing step
to discard the most suspicious location references using
the l1-Norm. As mentioned previously in section 3.2,
when minimizing the residues, the l1-Norm is known
to be more robust against outliers than any other lp-
Norm. Thus, after estimating the coordinate of a node
from all given references in a ﬁrst step, a speciﬁc ratio
of ¯ references with the largest residues is discarded in
a second step (¯ is a ﬁxed contamination ratio that is
assumed by the nodes of the network; note that the true
contamination ratio is unknown to the nodes). Finally,
the location of a node is estimated using the remaining
references. With the outlier detection capability of the
l1-Norm, we expect the residues of the malicious ref-
erences to be greater than the benign ones. Therefore
when ﬁltering the references with the 	N · ¯
 largest
residues, we assume to already achieve a notable im-
provement in reducing the inﬂuence of an attacker.
6. EVALUATION
To evaluate the suitability of the l1-Norm and com-
pare it to the l2-Norm, we implemented DV-hop using
OMNeT++ (http://www.omnetpp.org/) and the MiXiM
framework (http://mixim.sourceforge.net/) and incorpo-
rated the LLS and LMS approaches for both the l1 and
l2-Norm as well as the ﬁltering approach described in
section 5.2. Each LMS variant was evaluated using
M = 17 and M = 34 subsets, which corresponds to a
probability P = 0.99 for contamination ratio  = 0.3
and  = 0.4. Accordingly, we analyzed our ﬁltering ap-
proach discarding a ﬁxed ratio of ¯ = 0.3 and ¯ = 0.4.
The evaluation of existing approaches typically only
involved a simple Matlab based simulation employing
a ﬁxed radio range, comparatively high node densities
of 300 nodes on a ﬁeld of 100m × 100m [4] and sim-
ple distance measurement error models using a Gaus-
sian distribution [1] as well as single-hop based experi-
ments with about 15 nodes using a very small ﬁeld size
of about 18m × 18m [9]. These approaches use dif-
ferent settings and assumptions, lacking the simulation
of the process of reference distribution, hop length esti-
mation and selection, as well as mechanisms for reduc-
ing the trafﬁc caused by ﬂooding in the network (i.e.
by using a hop limit). Furthermore, experiments de-
ploying motes on a relatively small ﬁeld only consider
a single-hop scenario and are not suited for evaluating
the behavior of robust localization schemes in a large-
scale multi-hop environment. In addition, high node
densities might not be a very realistic assumption for
future applications.
Hence, we decided to head for a uniﬁed and more
realistic approach. Therefore, in addition to implement-
ing the multi-hop based DV-hop approach, we incorpo-
rated the IEEE 802.11 radio model provided byMiXiM
with its pathloss model and randomly placed 400 nodes
on a ﬁeld of size 2000m × 2000m using the uniform
distribution. In our scenario the applied transmission
power of 110.11mW roughly corresponds to a trans-
mission range of about 200m up to a maximum of 300m
in very rare cases. We selected the above mentioned
ﬁeld size to be 10 times the size of the approximate ra-
dio range, so that many nodes could only hear from an-
chors over multiple hops. Also, we selected the number
of nodes to be 400 to provide a stable yet relatively low
node density required to allow all participants to be part
of one connected communication graph. Furthermore,
we employed a ﬁxed anchor ratio of 10% (N = 40). A
smaller anchor ratio (e.g. 5%) would have been possi-
ble, yet we decided to use 10% to enable a fair compar-
ison between the different algorithms by making sure
there were enough references left for localization after
some being discarded by the robust schemes.
According to the phases of multi-hop localization
described in section 2, we implemented DV-hop as fol-
lows: Each anchor broadcasts a message containing its
location in a total of 10 rounds separated by intervals
of roughly 60 seconds for providing the network with
enough time to distribute the anchor messages. After
anchors having heard of other anchors, they calculate
a hop length estimate using either the mean or me-
dian of the possible estimates and include this infor-
mation in the message sent out in the next round. Al-
though two rounds should therefore be sufﬁcient, we
used 10 rounds to make sure messages have a good
chance of being distributed in the network and enough
anchors being able to estimate a hop length. Further-
more, as mentioned in section 2.1, we employed a hop
limit of 8 hops, which was selected to allow every node
to localize itself by obtaining references from about
60% of the anchors. Nodes and anchors maintain a
table of shortest paths to known anchors. Addition-
ally, nodes keep the most recent hop length estimate
announced by the corresponding anchor. Finally, with
anchors having ﬁnished the 10 rounds, nodes estimate
their location by selecting a hop length from the list of
available estimates and running each of the localization
algorithms with the parameter combinations mentioned
above. When selecting a hop length estimate, nodes al-
ways employ the same technique currently in use by
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the anchors, i.e. with anchors using the median of hop
length estimates, nodes also use the median.
To understand the importance of employing the me-
dian instead of the mean, it is necessary to explain the
effect of attackers indirectly exploiting honest nodes
and anchors to support the attack. Malicious anchors
increase the euclidean distance computed at benign an-
chors, while the number of hops between the anchors
remains untouched. Therefore, when estimating the
hop length using the mean, attackers may be able to af-
fect benign anchors to announce hop lengths increased
due to the inﬂuence of the malicious beacon nodes, re-
sulting in a possibly augmented strength of the attack.
Consequently, employing the mean, faked hop length
estimates resulting from forged anchor locations affect
the selected hop length at nodes. With the median being
able to ignore outliers up to 50%, it seems reasonable
to use the median instead of the mean for hop length es-
timation and selection to weaken the inﬂuence of mali-
cious anchors on benign participants. While the idea of
anchors using the median for estimating the hop length
is mentioned by ZENG et al. [4], the authors just state
the assumption without an evaluation to support it. Fur-
thermore, they only explicitly consider anchors to use
the median. In contrast, we employ the median on both
nodes and anchors believing that this will allow us to
see the full beneﬁt of the median compared to the mean.
To evaluate the robustness of the schemes employ-
ing the mean and median, we implemented the faked
anchor location attack described in section 4. Out of
N anchors, 	N · 
 are randomly selected to be mali-
cious. The contamination ratio  is varied from 10% to
40%. Malicious anchors fake their location by adding
a vector deﬁned by a common direction and length of
4000m to their actual coordinates. To measure the in-
ﬂuence of the attacking anchors, we use the mean esti-
mation error, which corresponds to the euclidean dis-
tance between the actual and estimated location of a
node.
First, we evaluated the inﬂuence of attacking an-
chors on the robust localization techniques using the
mean for hop length estimation and selection. The re-
sults averaged over 15 runs including the 99% conﬁ-
dence intervals (computed with the Student’s t-distri-
bution) are shown in ﬁg. 6 a. In this scenario, all algo-
rithms are heavily inﬂuenced by the attackers with the
mean estimation error ranging from 500m to 3500m.
As expected, l2-LLS is most vulnerable to the faked
locations, while l1-LLS is able to maintain a smaller
estimation error. This behavior is even more obvious
when  is above 25%, where the error for l2-LLS shows
a strong increase compared to l1-LLS. While the LMS
schemes perform better for  below 25%, for contam-
ination ratios above this value, they converge to the
curve of their respective LLS variant. We assume this
behavior is due to the effect of malicious anchors indi-
rectly inﬂuencing benign participants as described above.
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Fig. 1. Mean estimation error for faked location at-
tackers declaring their location 4000m away from their
actual coordinates. The lines are shown for the sake of
enhanced readability.
In this case the actual contamination ratio due to this
effect might be considerably higher than declared by
, resulting in the LMS techniques to loose their ﬁlter-
ing ability. The advantage of using a higher number
of M = 34 subsets is also visible, yet considering the
necessary double of computational overhead, the ad-
vantage of drawing more subsets is not as clear as to
be expected. Similarly, our ﬁltering approach performs
about the same for ¯ = 0.3 and ¯ = 0.4. Although it
perform worse than the LMS approaches for  < 0.25,
it is able to perform better compared to l1-LLS. Like
l1-LMS, it converges to l1-LLS for  > 0.25.
As mentioned above, although showing individual
behavior, when using the mean to estimate and select
the hop length, no technique is able to contain the at-
tack. In contrast, by employing the median, all algo-
rithms show a reduction of the mean estimation error
(ﬁg. 6 b). Yet there are signiﬁcant differences in the
amount of decrease. While l1-LLS, l2-LLS and our
ﬁltering approach are contained at an error of about
2100m for  = 0.4, the LMS schemes are able to keep
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an error of about 750m. They perform best for  < 0.25
with an error of about only 100m independent of the
norm and number of subsets. In case of  > 0.25,
l1-LMS shows a slight advantage, while a higher num-
ber of subsets shows the expected behavior of improved
outlier detection. Our ﬁltering approach is not able to
compete with the LMS variants in this setting. Never-
theless, for contamination ratios below 20%, it is able
to reduce the mean estimation error. This might be due
to the fact, that, in this case, by discarding 30% or 40%
of the references with the largest residues, a signiﬁcant
fraction of the malicious data is ﬁltered out correctly.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we described possible attacks concern-
ing multi-hop based approaches and proposed the use
of the l1-Norm instead of the l2-Norm to increase the
robustness of LLS and LMS methods. We evaluated
this proposal employing a uniﬁed and more realistic
simulation model and were able to clearly show the
advantage of the l1-Norm assuming the mean for es-
timating and selecting the hop length. Nevertheless, in
this setting even LMS-based approaches were unable
to contain the inﬂuence of a basic faked anchor loca-
tion attack. Therefore, we considered employing the
median to estimate and select the hop length to ﬁlter
the inﬂuence of benign participants indirectly support-
ing the attack. We were able to show that, by using
the median, the estimation error decreases for all algo-
rithms, with the LMS schemes most notably beneﬁting
from this change. Hence, we conclude that in multi-
hop environments LMS leads to more accurate results
applying the median instead of the mean to estimate
and select hop lengths.
In our future work, we plan to further investigate
the performance of robust localization schemes accord-
ing to the unique properties and threats of multi-hop
based approaches. Therefore, we aim at compiling a
more comprehensive survey of existing methods includ-
ing a decomposition of approaches and a comparative
evaluation under uniﬁed assumptions.
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